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The history of United States defense procurement is
delineated by several important events in the late 1940' s.
Preceding this era, it was evident that coordination between
the individual armed services was becoming increasingly
important. The National Security Act of 1947 first
established the Office of Secretary of Defense and The Armed
Services Procurement Act of 1947 formalized procurement policy
for defense. When the Department of Defense (DoD) was
established in 1949 to coordinate the individual services, a
major element of its mission was to coordinate and increase
efficiency in the process of defense procurement. Since 194 9,
DoD has evolved through a series of changes and attempts to
reform its procurement process. [Ref. l:p. 2]
In the 1960's, a new set of defense procurement reforms
were initiated by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
These reforms centered on the dispersal of procurement
responsibility to the lowest possible level with the top level
of management reviewing and ensuring that all decisions and
programs were consistent with one another. One result of this
policy was the evolution of increased data reporting
requirements by DoD activities that were monitoring civilian
contractors. Due to several problems during the
implementation of these reforms, they met with much
controversy and, over a period of time, resulted in a system
of procurement that was excessively centralized. [Ref . l:p. 8]
During the two decades which followed the McNamara
initiatives, each successive Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
cited acquisition inefficiencies as the major problem facing
the procurement process. In response, the Executive Branch,
Congress and the Services added more layers of management to
deal with the problems that caused the inefficiency.
Increased oversight required increased reporting by DoD
activities which in turn contributed to the centralization of
procurement management. [Ref. l:p. 12]
In 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management (commonly referred to as the Packard Commission)
reviewed the general management of DoD. The acquisition
process was specifically studied in an effort to identify
problems and recommend actions to stimulate procurement
reform. They viewed cost growth, schedule delays and
performance shortfalls as problems that could be rectified by:
9 Integrated streamlining of the acquisition process.
# Better planning early in the procurement cycle.
• Encouraging more testing and prototypes. [Ref. l:p. 7]
Despite efforts by each administration since 1961 to
reform defense procurement by streamlining it and
decentralizing its management, complete success has not been
achieved. Meanwhile, the flow of management information has
increased by necessity to meet the demands of additional
layers of defense management and the Congressional committees
and subcommittees charged with defense procurement oversight.
[Ref. 2]
In February of 1989, the newly-elected President, George
Bush, charged Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney with
reviewing defense management. In response, the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) announced a plan for fully implementing the
recommendations of the Packard Commission of 1986 and
reforming the defense acquisition system. This response in
July of 1989 was delivered in the Defense Management Report to
the President (DMR) . [Ref. 3]
One primary objective of the DMR was the streamlining and
consolidation of the acquisition process between the various
services. In an effort to reduce government overhead costs,
the services' systems commands were reorganized to eliminate
the layers of supervision that added little or no value to the
process. Procurement functions that were accomplished by each
individual service were identified for review and possible
elimination. Redundancies in the purchase, management,
payment and reporting of DoD acquisitions will be eliminated
by forming one acquisition activity headed by the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition. When this is fully
implemented, no contract administration office will report
directly to its respective military service but each office
will instead report to a Department of Defense organization
that supports all branches of the service. To further reduce
overhead, the implementation of the DMR initiatives will
consolidate these contract administrative services under the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) rather than establishing a new
management structure. [Ref. 4:p. 9]
The intended result of implementing these DMR
recommendations is a uniform enforcement of policies and
regulations and a streamlined organization which will generate
savings primarily through manpower reductions. The DMR calls
for a 15% reduction in logistics, distribution and related
maintenance agencies by 1993. The projected increase in
efficiencies will result in a personnel force by 1995 which is
reduced by approximately 18,000 civilian and 24,000 military
positions in acquisition management [Ref. 4:p. 9 - 10]. The
aggregate cost savings from streamlining, improved management,
and personnel reductions are estimated at $30 billion [Ref. 5:
p. 5] . A further manpower reduction is planned by increased
self-policing by business and industry. This will allow for
a 2 5% reduction of government auditors at contractors' plants
by 1995 [Ref. 6:p. 283].
When implemented, these recommendations constitute a major
change in the data gathering and reporting requirements for
contract administration offices that have historically
reported via a chain of command strictly within the Army,
Navy, or Air Force. Such offices previously received
direction for data collection and reporting from the cognizant
branch of service for their office. However, after all
contract administration offices begin reporting to DLA, the
use of a standard automated system will be required.
Based on studies conducted in 1987 at the Army Plant
Representative Office at the McDonnell Douglas Plant in Mesa,
Arizona, the DMR implementation plan specified the DLA
developed computer software called "Mechanization of Contract
Administration Services (MOCAS)" as the standard for all
procurement activities to use.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research effort was to recommend the
most efficient method of gathering management information that
would satisfy the requirements of the newly imposed MOCAS
reporting system while still providing the degree of detail
deemed necessary for effective on-site management of the
contracts. While the two requirements are not totally
incompatible, there are difficulties in meeting both goals
with one system. This thesis will not analyze the need for
the elements of information or the use of that information,
but will examine the alternative methods of getting all the
data elements considered by a DPRO Commander to be needed to
meet internal and external management requirements.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
In an effort to accomplish the objectives of this
research, the following question was studied:
What is the most efficient method of gathering the
information which is considered necessary for on-site
management of a field level Navy contract administration
office that is converted to a Defense Plant Representative
Office (DPRO) considering that use of the automated reporting
system, Mechanization of Contract Administration Services
(MOCAS) , is mandatory for reporting to management at a level
above each field activity?
Answers to the secondary research questions support the
conclusions reached by this research effort. The secondary
questions are as follows:
• What items of information were collected under the NAVPRO
Contract Administration Management Information System
(CAMIS) model that are not required for MOCAS?
I What is the most effective and efficient method of
collecting management information at the Defense Plant
Representative Office at the Naval Systems Division plant
of FMC Corporation (DPRO FMC)
,
giv that the reporting
requirements of MOCAS have been ii ' sed upon all Plant
Representative Offices?
I What modifications would be required to MOCAS if it was
to serve as the sole management information system of the
managers at the DPROs?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis is limited to one type of
contract administration field office that is directly affected
by the change in reporting requirements, the Plant
Representative Office. These offices are located at the site
of civilian contractors and their purpose is to manage the
contracts awarded to that contractor by the DoD contracting
offices. The fundamental mission of all Plant Representative
Offices is the delivery of a product conforming to the
schedule, meeting the quality specifications and purchased at
a fair and reasonable price. Therefore, the product of a
Plant Representative Office is not a physical deliverable but
rather the provision of a service which manages the successful
delivery of the product. The accomplishment of the Plant
Representative's task is dependent upon the frequent and
accurate flow of information between the Contracting Office,
the Payment Office, the Program Manager, the Contractor, and
the Plant Representative Office. When these service-specific
Plant Representative Offices become Defense Plant
Representative Offices (DPROs) , the mission will remain
basically the same but the reporting requirements will change
significantly.
A specific Plant Representative Office was studied in this
thesis. The recommendations are therefore limited to the
situation at this activity, DPRO FMC. This activity was
chosen because, as a former Navy field activity reporting to
the Naval Sea System Command (NAVSEA) , it had already
developed a creative and very effective automated system
(CAMIS) for the collection of management information.
Although the automated system satisfied the needs of
operational, tactical, and strategic managers at a Navy Plant
Representative Office, it failed to fit the reporting
framework required of DLA activities. The MOCAS system does
not provide the same level of detail that is found in CAMIS
but is nevertheless required. DPRO FMC was also chosen
because it converted from a Navy activity to a DLA activity
recently and is still in the process of evaluating its
requirements and exploring the available options for meeting
management information needs. The findings of this research
may be applicable or helpful to other commands in evaluating
their data collection methods after a similar conversion.
However, conclusions and recommendations are command-specific
and, although relevant during the time period in which the
research was conducted, they may become obsolete as management
priorities change and the organization continues to evolve.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The majority of research in support of this thesis was
completed by personal interviews with the Commander of DPRO
FMC, the Contracts Division Head, the Contracts Branch Head,
the Administrative Contracting Officer, Property
Administrator, Industrial Specialists, Engineers, and Contract
Administrators. Copies of all routine reporting documents for
a given period were obtained from each functional division
manager for subsequent review and analysis. Each routine
report generated by CAMIS was compared to the corresponding
report from MOCAS. Each data element that was collected by
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either report as a transaction process was tracked to
determine its use as management information. The specific
data fields that were collected by CAMIS but were not found in
MOCAS were discussed with the Division Head and DPRO Commander
to verify the use and necessity of the data for the successful
management of the activity. All data received through
personal interviews was verified for accuracy with the
immediate supervisor and summarized for discussion with the
divisional managers.
The computer support staff of DPRO FMC was interviewed to
get information on the background of CAMIS and to determine
their staff role in the organization with respect to the
collection of management information. Documentation for the
divisional data bases of CAMIS was reviewed to verify the
ability of management to respond to ad hoc queries. This
information was compared to the ad hoc requirements described
by the functional managers. A summary of these discussions
was verified by the Support Staff Division Head and the Deputy
Commander.
Information was also obtained from the Defense Contract
Administration Region (DCASR) St. Louis' Transition Management
Office and the Defense Systems Automation Command in St.
Louis. Extensive MOCAS documentation and training manuals
were reviewed to determine the flow and use of information
collected by MOCAS. The transaction processing reports of
MOCAS were compared to the summarized DCASR management reports
to trace the operational data elements and find how those
elements were used by the top level of DCASR management for
strategic decision making.
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II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOMATION AT DPRO FMC
A. INTRODUCTION
DPRO FMC is located in Fridley, Minnesota at an industrial
plant operated by the Naval Systems Division of FMC
Corporation. The primary mission of the command is the
contract administration and facility management of the Naval
Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant (NIROP) . Since 1940, the
majority of production in the factory has been a result of
contracts with the Department of Defense, foreign governments,
or as a sub-contractor for other Defense Department prime
contractors. The Naval Systems Division of FMC is the Navy's
primary manufacturer of shipboard Guided Missile Launching
Systems and medium and major caliber guns. Beginning in the
1960's, contracts were administered under the auspices of the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) . On 1 October 1982, the office
was converted from Defense Contract Administrative Services
Plant Representative Office located at Northern Ordnance
Division of FMC Corporation (DCASPRO NOD) to NAVPRO
MINNEAPOLIS and became an echelon three command reporting
directly to the Commander, Naval Sea System Commands (NAVSEA)
.
The name of the contractor's plant was subsequently changed
from Northern Ordnance Division (NOD) to Naval Systems
Division (NSD) in 1987. [Ref. 7]
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B. BACKGROUND
Prior to the ,1982 conversion, DCASPRO NOD reported to the
Defense Contract Administrative Services Region (DCASR) St.
Louis via the Mechanization of Contract Administration
Services (MOCAS) system. After the DCASPRO was changed from
a DLA activity to a Navy field activity, a new automated
system for data collection was deemed necessary. However, the
use of a standard automated system was not mandated by NAVSEA
as was the case during the period of oversight by DLA.
NAVPRO MINNEAPOLIS was responsible for reporting contract
administration activity directly to NAVSEA (Code SEA-028)
which compiled the information for use by NAVSEA managers. The
reports were consolidated with the data reported by the three
other NAVSEA Plant Representative Offices and forwarded to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics
(ASN (S & L) ) . Specific elements of periodic activity and
totals of contractual actions performed during the period were
requested from each field activity on formatted reports.
These figures were derived locally, sum r ized, and mailed to
NAVSEA (SEA-028) at the end of each reporting period. Cut-off
dates were established by field activities to allow time for
compilation and transmission of reports to arrive by the
monthly, quarterly or annual deadline. On-line systems were
not used by any of the four Plant Representative Offices
reporting to SEA-028.
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The periodic reports consisted of total numbers of
contractual actions and the dollar values for various
groupings of the actions as dictated by NAVSEA. The method of
data collection, whether manual, using automation, or a
combination of both, was determined by managers at the field
activity. Because of their familiarity and historical use of
MOCAS, NAVPRO MINNEAPOLIS decided to develop an automated
system for contract data collection.
C. DEVELOPMENT
The Contract Administration Management Information System
(CAMIS) was developed by NAVPRO MINNEAPOLIS in 1982 to support
the contract administration function. It was patterned after
the portion of MOCAS that captured the number of contractual
actions and the monetary values of these actions. Data was
collected on each contract by contract number, order number,
status of the definitization process (if that order was placed
as an unpriced order) , total dollar amount obligated,
contractor's proposed dollar value, total value after
definitization, and date of physical completion. Monthly
reports were produced by NAVPRO MINNEAPOLIS on their centrally
managed mainframe computer and the categorized totals were
reported to SEA-028 under the signature of the NAVPRO
Contracts Division Head. Then these categorical summaries
were entered into a spreadsheet program on a personal computer
by a procurement clerk working within the contracts division
at NAVPRO. This spreadsheet would then be used to graphically
13
display the status of contract numbers and dollars, the values
and numerical assessment of the contracts opened and closed
during the period, and the workload accomplished by the
division, as indicated by these numbers. All data entry was
the responsibility of one procurement clerk who acted on
information provided by the contract administrators. The
contract administrators dealt almost exclusively with raw data
from the hard copy which was maintained within individual
contract folders.
From the beginning of the CAMIS life cycle, changes were
required to keep the program current. Although requests for
changes were not documented by the computer support staff, it
is reasonable to expect that the causes for the requests were
similar to those documented by other software development
organizations
.
Software development organizations typically find that
approximately 20% of maintenance requests are for corrections
to the source code. More importantly, approximately 50% are
classified as perfective maintenance. Perfective maintenance
is defined as work done on a successful software product to
enhance capabilities, modify existing functions, or provide
new user-requested capabilities. 25% of work can be expected
for adaptive maintenance which is considered necessary for
keeping pace with a changing environment and increased demands
either internally or externally imposed. [Ref. 8, 9]
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During 1982 to 1987, CAMIS required maintenance in all of
these categories. Several new requirements were imposed by
NAVSEA (SEA-028) to satisfy requirements of managers at
NAVSEA. Some programming errors were discovered which caused
inconsistent reporting. Local managers wanted more relevant
data for workload accounting management and to provide fast
responses for ad hoc queries. Unfortunately, the centrally
managed nature of CAMIS caused problems in prioritizing and
quickly implementing improvements to the system. By delaying
the work, later maintenance efforts became more difficult and
the organization eventually used all available resources to
maintain the old software rather than develop new products to
meet the new demands.
Although software maintenance can often account for over
60% of developmental costs, [Ref. 10] the limited NAVPRO
maintenance resources were not budgeted for such extensive
maintenance on CAMIS. In 1987, a moratorium was placed on all
improvements to CAMIS until an ad hoc committee of NAVPRO
employees could analyze the NAVPRO information requirements
and recommend a strategic plan for development of a
comprehensive management information system. The committee
found that the command was dependent upon CAMIS and must
commit to improving it for survival in the short term, because
it was the only repository of summarized data. Raw data was
intact in each contract file but there existed no other system
to summarize, categorize, and collate data from the nearly
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two-thousand contracts. The recommended strategic plan was to
develop a fully integrated network of distributed databases on
personal computers. Real-time information would be available
in a detailed format for workers in each functional division
(i.e., contract administrators, industrial specialists,
property administrators, quality assurance representatives,
etc.) . Selected summaries could be provided to local managers
and would also be the basis for external reports.
A permanent committee was formed to analyze the
requirements of a new, integrated system. It was composed of
representatives from each functional division and chaired by
the Division Head of Support Services, the only trained
systems analyst on the committee. Following an enthusiastic
start, the project lost command visibility when the committee
chairman left the command in 1988. The project was soon
abandoned due to the lack of support and trained leadership.
However, concurrent with committee planning for an
integrated system, more personal computers were purchased and
the use of them proliferated at the divisional work level.
Over a two-year period, each division within the organization
developed its own stand-alone database for day-to-day use.
The contracts division was the last division to develop and
transfer all data elements to an off-the-shelf database
management system. In March of 1990, CAMIS became obsolete
when all external reports were generated by the personal
computer programs which were developed for use by the
16
procurement clerks and contract administrators as well as
supervisors and management. The new personal computer system
uses ENABLE software and is referred to by NAVPRO employees as
CAMIS II.
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III. BUSINESS OBJECTIVES OF THE ORGANIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
When evaluating the automated information system of any
organization, it is paramount that the business objectives are
understood so that the gathering of information supports these
objectives. The successful application of any information
system is dependent upon the accurate assessment of how data
elements are collected and for what purposes they are used.
[Ref. ll:p. 40 - 41] This chapter concentrates on the use of
the collected data to support the business objectives of the
contract administration activities within DoD.
The broadest objectives of all levels in the contract
administration cycle are the same. They are to ensure that
the service/supply is acquired from the most appropriate
source at a fair and reasonable price and delivered as
specified in the contract. The functions performed by
contract administration offices are th |e which conclude or
complete the acquisition cycle. [Ref. 12 :p. 16] In general,
requirements have already been defined, funds have been
committed, and the contractor has been awarded the contract.
The contract administration office then is responsible for the
management of contractor compliance to the terms and
conditions of the contract. While the business objective is
the same for all activities contributing to the acquisition
18
process, it is important to understand the method of
implementation from the two perspectives that contributed to
the development of the automated management information
systems being used at the DCASR and at DPRO FMC.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF MOCAS BY DCASR
With the creation of the Defense Logistics Agency in the
early 1960*s, a sub-agency was created to administer DoD
contracts. This organization was called the Defense Contract
Administrative Services (DCAS) . DCAS was sub-divided into
geographic areas of responsibility called DCAS Regions
(DCASRs) . Each region was further sub-divided into DCAS
Management Areas (DCASMAs) . The DCASMA was given area-wide
responsibility unless the amount or complexity of government
contracts at one contractor's plant required a dedicated work
force. [Ref. 12 :p. 17] Such dedicated teams were called DCAS
Plant Representative Offices (DCASPROs)
.
After the DMR implementation is completed, all DCASPROs as
well as the individual service Plant Representative Offices
will become Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs) . As
all service Plant Representative Offices are converted to
DPROs during the consolidation phase, they will report to the
DCASR in whose geographic region they reside. DCASRs are also
in the process of reorganizing into Defense Contract
Management Regions (DCMRs) as part of the DMR initiatives but




To "manage" a contractor's compliance to the terms and
conditions of a contract is a very ambiguous and complex
organizational goal. Management, as defined by Mary Parker
Follett, is "...the art of getting things done through
people." [Ref. 13: p. 7] While there are few places where this
definition more aptly applies than in the contract
administration/management field, it does not define the entire
task that is involved. There is no universally accepted
definition of management, but one commonly accepted
description is that of a systematic way of planning,
organizing, leading, and controlling to achieve the desired
goals [Ref. 13:p. 8].
Using this definition as a basis, the DCASR must manage
the people who ultimately provide the supply or service to the
government. One widely accepted management method is
Management by Objectives. This is done by setting goals for
subordinate managers, allocating resources, providing the
atmosphere that encourages accomplishment of goals, and
evaluating performance to ensure that goals are being
accomplished.
Because of the inherent geographic distances between the
DCASR and the contract administrators, this task has an added
difficulty. A steady flow of information is necessary to keep
the DCASR apprised of the status of contracts assigned to the
commander at each activity. The data taken from MOCAS is
summarized into reports which are used by DCASR management
20
personnel for future business planning and for evaluating
performance against goals.
MOCAS was designed as a centrally operated system which
would automate the requirements imposed by Military Standard
Contract Administration Procedures (MILSCAP) . MILSCAP is an
external communication system directed by DoD which prescribes
standard data requirements which govern the flow of contract
administration data between DoD activities. As used by the
DCASR, MOCAS is a repository of contract actions, delivery
schedules, shipments, obligations, payments, and closeout
status. This information is also used by regional functional
divisions in support of engineering, production, quality
assurance, finance, property, transportation, and payment
offices. As part of MILSCAP, it also communicates with
buying, payment, and receiving activities. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
Each DCASR operates its own MOCAS system on an AMDAHL
470/V8 mainframe computer with selected data downloaded to a
microcomputer for on-line access by contract administrators
and other activities. [Ref. 15: Appendix A, p. 41] Such a
configuration is indicative of a highly centralized
organization and provides the information necessary from the
DCASR' s management perspective. That is a perspective which
includes the DCASR as the holder and maintainer of
information. It is supported by the functional offices and
shared with related services but centrally controlled by the
DCASR.
21
Centralized computing facilities were driven by the state
of technology in the 1950' s and 1960 's. Large spaces with
specially trained technicians were devoted to support the
bulky and relatively expensive equipment. For organizations
that required tight control of information handling and a need
for all work to be done in close proximity, the central
computing facility matched the business objectives. However,
for those organizations that are divided geographically with
different divisions responsible for various data elements, the
centralized system was usually implemented for economic and
technical efficiency. This did not necessarily maximize the
organization's effectiveness towards meeting their business
objectives. [Ref. 16:p. 2 - 23]
When evaluating the effectiveness of MOCAS from an
unbiased viewpoint, it can be seen as an effective way for the
DCASR to achieve their primary business objective which is to
manage the region's contract administration functions. As
contracts are awarded and subsequent actions related to those
contracts are documented, they are mainly input into MOCAS at
one central location. [Ref. 14: p. 7] Based on information
derived from this automation, decisions are made for the
management of budget and human resources at the field activity
level. To understand the impact of centralized control, the
flow of information as it relates to the DCASR must be
examined and understood.
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When a contract is awarded, the Procurement Contracting
Officer (PCO) distributes copies to the contractor, the
Contract Administration Office (CAO) , and the Payment Office.
This is either done by sending written documents through the
mail or by electronic transmission between activities that are
so equipped. When the Administrative Contracting Officer
(ACO) at the field activity issues an order or contract
modification, the flow of information is the same except that
it is originated by the ACO and mailed to the PCO. This
constitutes the establishment of that contract in the MOCAS
data base. When the contractor completes the requirements of
a line item of the contract and the Quality Assurance
Representative (QAR) accepts delivery, information from the
hard copy of DD Form 2 50 is input into MOCAS. The system
automatically generates a Shipment Performance Notice (SPN)
for transmission to the Inventory Manager (or other ADP
activity if so designated on the contract) . If inspection and
acceptance is at destination, the system transmits a
notification of shipment with a request for acceptance via the
Destination Acceptance Reporting and Tracking System (DARTS)
.
When accepted at destination, a hard copy of DD Form 250 is
mailed to the DCASR Comptroller Office for entry into MOCAS.
With each delivery of contract line items, an invoice is
mailed to the DCASR for payment. When shipment and acceptance
documents are matched with the contract and this invoice,
payment is made. Checks are mailed to the contractor from the
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DCASR Comptroller Office and Contract Payment Notices (CPNs)
are transmitted to the appropriate funding office.
Subvouchers are simultaneously mailed to finance centers to
document payment against the designated appropriation account.
The DCASR is required to notify the PCO of any potential
delinquencies. MOCAS tracks delivery dates in order to
generate Delay in Delivery notices, DLA Form 1654. Revised
Delivery Forecast (RDF) notices are generated by the field
activity with recommended action for the PCO. A Contract
Completion Notice (CCN) is sent to the PCO when significant
events such as physical completion, final payment, or ACO
closing of the contract occurs. If closeout cannot be
implemented within the mandatory period allowed by DFARS Sup
2, the estimated closeout date and reason for delay is input
into MOCAS for observance by the PCO.
Finally, MOCAS generates reports to recap actions that
have occurred during given periods. Disbursement and
accounting reports are mailed to finance centers for
reconciliation of payments made and „ llections received
during the period. Reports categorizing activity by each
Contract Administration Office within the region are mailed to
each activity for verification and reconciliation either
daily, weekly, or monthly. [Ref. 14 :p. 3-6]
The timeliness of mailing hard copies of contractual
actions and reports to field activities and vice versa is
considered insignificant if the data elements have been
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captured for on-line viewing when they are needed by the DCASR
level of management. Workload, evaluation, and staffing plans
for each subordinate command can be determined by evaluating
the number of contractual actions that were accomplished
during the reporting period.
Many of the data elements collected by MOCAS are necessary
for generating notices and ensuring timely payments. These
are called the functional elements. For example, if a line
item is past the delivery due date and no shipment or
acceptance has been documented, certain actions must follow.
The use of functional elements by managers is generally in the
form of summarized or compiled data. It becomes management
information as opposed to functional data when managers review
summarized data for the detection of trends that may or may
not support the business objectives. If no delinquent line
items are reported, management might reward those responsible
or possibly focus dedicated resources to other areas. If the
trend is one of increasing delinquencies, the symptoms alone
cannot be treated but the root problem must be ascertained and
corrected. Managers may need to restructure resources to
rectify the problem.
The management information that is gleaned from MOCAS is
of this latter type. It shows some trends when compared to
performance of the same event during previous time periods,
but more importantly it shows comparisons between activities.
In order to plan, organize, lead and control, the DCASR looks
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at the following types of summarized information which are
derived by totaling the number of actions documented in MOCAS
during the period.
1. Overaged Contracts
The percentage of overaged contracts compared to total
contracts at each activity within the DCASR are listed. The
same figures aggregated for the whole region are then compared
to DLA goals. The performance is then reviewed by the current
fiscal year juxtaposed against the past fiscal year.
Undefinitized contractual actions for the region that are
overaged are also compared to the previous fiscal year and the
DLA goal. Using standards that estimate the effort required
to complete unaccomplished tasks, the number of work years
needed by the DCASR to meet DLA goals is computed.
2 . Open Contracts
The most significant data reported at the DCASR level
is the basic number of open contracts held within the region
during the months of the current fiscal year. These open
contracts are then quantified by total dollar value and
sub-divided by obligated value and unliquidated value. The
same information is broken down by each activity within the
region. This provides the DCASR with a snapshot view of the




The responsibility to arrive at a fair and reasonable
price to the government often lies with the contract
administration office. The metric used to measure attainment
of this goal is the number of cases that are reviewed by the
price analysts. Therefore, the DCASR is concerned with the
goals and accomplishments of pricing reviews and the value of
savings that are recommended by reviews of the contractors'
pricing proposals. Reports are generated from the MOCAS data
base that document the numbers of proposals that were reviewed
each month and compare it to previous fiscal years. The
difference between a contractor's proposed price and the final
negotiated price is referred to as a recommended saving, and
these savings are then totaled for each quarter and compared
to quarterly goals set by DLA.
4. Delinquency Rate
Since a major goal of contract administration is the
delivery of products or services when and where they are
needed, those items which fail to meet the delivery date
criteria are of great interest to upper management. The
number of delinquent line items compared to the total number
of line items delivered during the period is monitored and
compared between each activity. The sum of these
delinquencies is totaled for the DCASR and then compared
against all other regions for that month.
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5. Engineering and QA Workload
The functional divisions of Engineering and Quality
Assurance are monitored by the number of actions they
performed in specified areas. Engineering Change Proposals
(ECPs) are counted for each activity and also for the region,
as are the dollar savings expected from Value Engineering
Change Proposals (VECPs) during the period. Quality Assurance
is measured by the number of contracts with QA actions
reguired and the shipments processed by the QA division for
the month as compared to previous fiscal years. The dollar
value of shipments released and the value of products
in-process is tabulated for the month and reported by each
activity as well as for the whole region. These metrics of
accomplishment are compared to the number of QA work years
consumed for each month and the trend is plotted for this
fiscal year against the past year. An important facet of the
DCASR concern for accomplishments at the field activity is the
number of Material Review Board (MRB) actions taken during the
reporting period for the region and broken down for comparison
between each activity. The volume of activity is evaluated
for actions reported on Quality Deficiency Reports (QDRs) for
the same period and compared by activity.
6. Support Office Activity
The DCASR also retrieves information from MOCAS that
is necessary to coordinate activities between supporting
offices. This data is not broken out by actions that can be
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directly related to activity at specific field offices and
therefore is unlikely to be used by the commanders of the
contract administration offices. Examples of activities which
are external to the DCASR but support management decisions at
the regional level are the Office of Comptroller, Office of
Policy and Plans, Office of Civilian Personnel, and Office of
Telecommunications and Information Services.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF CAMIS AT DPRO FMC
When the Department of the Navy assumed command of the
former DCASPRO NOD, a decision had to be made concerning the
method of data collection. As a NAVPRO reporting to the Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , no standardized management
information system was required for use by all NAVPROs. When
faced with the choice between continuing to use MOCAS and
reimbursing DLA for the services they provided or developing
an independent system, the NAVPRO Commander decided to create
a new and more responsive automated system. This new system
was designed to collect data elements that were used
specifically for supporting Department of Navy needs.
Although the system was originally designed to predominantly
support the Contracts Division by use of a mainframe program,
it has evolved into a system of several loosely related
divisional programs on personal computers. Because these
diverse data bases are all intended to support the
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) , this stage of
development will be referred to generically as CAMIS II.
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The discussion thus far has assumed that the majority of
strategic planning and management decisions are accomplished
at the DCASR level and that the commander of each DPRO makes
decisions which equate to a tactical level of management. The
functional divisions (Quality Assurance, Engineering,
Industrial Specialists, and the Contracts Division) would
comprise the category of operational employees if viewed from
the DCASR 's perspective. This perspective is a reflection of
the centralization of control at the regional level and
supports the rationale that the DCASR requires the greatest
access to the output from the automated data collection system
to set goals and objectives for the DPROs. The DPRO
Commanders are the implementers of tactical plans to achieve
the strategic goals as set forth by the DCASR.
The four NAVPROs that reported to NAVSEA were given great
flexibility and acted somewhat autonomously in analyzing and
developing their information systems. The support that was
required of each NAVPRO by the customers (i.e., program
managers, item managers, in-service en
r
neering activities,
etc.) was defined and documented in the mission statement of
the NAVPRO. The degree of support and the best way to provide
the support was determined at the field level by the Plant
Representative Office acting within the constraints of the
financial limitations imposed by NAVSEA. With the setting of
goals and means of implementation more liberally delegated,
NAVPRO commanders functioned to a greater extent as the
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strategic planners while the functional division heads acted
as the middle managers making the tactical decisions. [Ref.
17:p. 24 - 26]
The life of a system evolves through a series of stages
which comprise the system life cycle. The general stages of
a system life cycle consist of the definition of the need,
system development, installation, operation and obsolescence
(the phase during which a system is retired) [Ref. 18:p. 55].
The system developmental stage is the most important stage of
the life cycle for all software projects because of the effect
it has on other stages of the life cycle. The developmental
stage was especially important to the implementation of CAMIS
II because the end users were allowed to work independently
and without the constraints of a schedule or the requirement
to deliver a product to a customer. The other four stages of
the life cycle of CAMIS II are of no less importance but have
been or will be largely determined by forces beyond the
control of NAVPRO MINNEAPOLIS.
The definition of a need for CAMIS was a de facto
determination in 1982 that NAVPRO MINNEAPOLIS would continue
collecting data just as it had before its conversion from
DCASPRO NOD. No analysis of the requirements was documented,
but a program was hastily written to collect the data elements
necessary for the new reporting requirements imposed by NAVSEA
(SEA-028) . The installation of CAMIS in 1982 was driven by
schedule considerations and involved no end users' inputs.
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CAMIS II is currently in the operational stage of the
system life cycle. This stage is of major importance because
it is the longest phase in the life of a system. If CAMIS II
is considered as an enhancement of CAMIS I rather than a new
system, the operational stage of the life cycle has been
continuing since 1982. However, it is more likely that all of
the stages were repeated for CAMIS II and an abbreviated life
cycle plan was followed within each division even though it
was not documented. The success of the installation and
operational phases are both dependent upon the success of the
development phase. Therefore, the primary emphasis of the
discussion which follows deals with the implementation of
CAMIS with respect to the development phase. The last stage,
obsolescence or retirement, will be evaluated after the
conversion to DPRO FMC is complete.
The most critical aspect to consider when developing an
information system is to ensure that it effectively meets the
stated business objective of the organization. The secondary
factors that contribute to the system's success are related to
building a flexible and maintainable system while ensuring its
integrity and reliability. [Ref. 18 :p. 33]
Several important lessons were learned from the
implementation of CAMIS I. Although these were never
explicitly stated, they became the "common sense" that
contributed to the success of CAMIS II. Several basic
concepts were incorporated into the development of CAMIS II
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which helped guarantee accomplishment of both the primary and
secondary critical success factors. The system was originally
developed by the end user. Applications were written by
operational level employees using the Menu Generators and
Macro Command functions of ENABLE software. Because the end
user created the data base and application programs, all
necessary data elements for the operational level were
included. The results were frequently presented to
supervisors and managers who directed that relevant changes
and enhancements be incorporated. This ensured that the raw
data used for transaction processing was properly manipulated
to produce useful management information. The iterative
approach was very successful in ensuring all requirements were
met to support the NAVPRO's goals. By dividing the project
into several unique divisional data bases, the development
teams had a clear understanding of the requirements and goals.
As each division developed its portion of the project, small
samples of data were used for modeling each process. Managers
reviewed each model to ensure that both transaction processing
and management information was accurate and useful. The
iterations of changes, review and feedback continued until a
mature system had evolved. It cannot be overstated that these
successful principles of development were not consciously
adhered to but rather were done intuitively based on the
experience gained from the development of CAMIS I and by
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producing prototypes for management review. [Ref. 18 :p. 36 -
39]
The evolution from MOCAS (pre-1982) to CAMIS II is a
direct result of the NAVPRO Commander viewing the NAVPRO as a
microcosm of the larger acquisition process. The automated
system changed because the NAVPRO shifted the emphasis from
transaction processing and the transmission of raw data, to a
system that provided management information to be used by
managers in support of the local strategic planning and
evaluation process. The relative importance of data elements
changed significantly during this period. Typically,
individual contract data elements had been summarized only
into groups that showed the numbers and dollar values of total
contracts. The emphasis was changed and after CAMIS II was
operational, the raw data could be used to provide detailed
reports and real-time information for operational employees
and tactical managers.
There are many examples of changes developed for CAMIS II
which improved the level of support and service provided by
the NAVPRO. Some specific changes that were implemented in
CAMIS II by the functional divisions at NAVPRO are discussed
below.
The first significant change developed for the CAMIS II
data base was the level of detail into which each contract was
sub-divided. MOCAS and the original CAMIS were designed to
break down a contract into units called line items. Line
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items are generally individual parts, systems or services but
can also be groupings of related parts, systems or services.
A data element that categorizes items or services into related
groupings is insufficient to track individual deliverables.
CAMIS II provides for tracking of all part numbers
included in a line item. This allows the Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO) to affect notification before the
actual delinquency date of the line item. If a delivery date
is going to be missed, a notice is automatically generated by
CAMIS II. The ACO informs the Procurement Contracting Officer
(PCO) of the impending delinquency and may make a
recommendation to change the contract. Simultaneously, a
letter is generated for the ACO's signature which requests
consideration from the contractor in return for the
government's acceptance of a delinquent product. It also
serves notice to the contractor that no rights of the
government are waived by acceptance of the delinquent item and
further actions may be taken by the PCO. The Industrial
Specialist (IS) annotates the data base with the reason for
the possible delinquency so that managers can take action to
avoid similar problems in the future or to evaluate trends
that appear over time. This documentation and notification
process is especially important if the government is
responsible for the delay or if the responsibility is in
question. The reasons for the delinquency are independently
evaluated by the contractor's planners and also by the
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government's IS Division. The analysis is provided to the IS
manager and the ACO, and it is forwarded to the PCO if the ACO
determines that this is appropriate.
This information is available on-line in CAMIS II for ad
hoc queries by the IS Division. Raw data is entered by IS
Division personnel and the data base is maintained on personal
computers physically located in the IS Division office.
Routine reports displaying summarized data are generated by
the IS Division and the information is grouped by individual
contracts and weapon systems.
A second significant change made during the development of
CAMIS II was the creation of an automated data base to support
the Property Administrator. Property administration plays a
vital role in the management of contracts at DPRO FMC. In
addition to maintaining accounts for property assigned to
active contracts and providing disposition instructions prior
to a contract being closed, the Property Administrator at DPRO
FMC also manages the government owned facilities. As a Naval
Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant (NIROI » the government owns
approximately 80% of the plant and equipment at FMC-Naval
Systems Division. The predominance of production at FMC-Naval
Systems Division since 194 has been the result of contracts
with the Department of Navy. Some residual parts, tools,
equipment and machinery from past production are kept to
ensure that an industrial base is maintained in the event of
a national emergency. The volume of records and the
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complexity of assigning ownership has created a special need
for management of the contractor's systems that account for
government owned material purchased and/or produced during
this period. Without a complete and comprehensive data base
that associated the contract number and type to specific
pieces of government owned property, the Property
Administrator would not be able to monitor and evaluate the
contractor's responsibility to maintain accurate and detailed
records of government owned property.
The Property Administrator must also be able to answer ad
hoc queries that are frequently made by members of
organizations external to the DPRO (i.e., item managers,
program managers, purchasing agents at supply centers, etc.)
requesting information regarding the availability of
government owned spare parts. Special tools and equipment as
well as residual and excess government owned property are
tracked by several criteria that affect its disposition.
Criteria such as the type of contract which ordered the
material, specific clauses included in the contract, special
agreements between the PCO and the contractor, the degree of
completion to which parts were manufactured and the level of
testing accomplished may determine the use of government owned
property.
For example, Type Commanders may receive a Casualty Report
(CASREP) requesting a non-standard replacement part for a
weapon system manufactured by FMC-Naval Systems Division. A
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call to DPRO FMC could determine whether the specific part was
available in a stock room at FMC. If the part was available,
ownership would need to be determined. The Property
Administrator could ascertain if the part was government owned
by simply reviewing the data base. If the part was maintained
as residual material for a cost-type contract, it belongs to
the government. If the contracting activity has maintained
cognizance of parts residual to their contracts, that
contracting activity must give permission for shipment of the
requested part before satisfying the CASREP with the
government owned material. The data base must provide all of
this data as well as information pertaining to the condition
of the part (i.e., partially completed, completed but
untested, date of last physical inventory, etc.) and the
part's storage location.
In the same example, if the part requested was available
but was excess to a firm fixed-price contract, it must be
referenced to a weapon system so the cognizant program manager
can be contacted. If the part is in the manufacturing
process, a sale order number would be required to possibly
divert that part to satisfy the CASREP. This information
would be required before calling the item manager for the
weapon system to place an order to procure that part from FMC.
When the Property Administrator is notified that the
government Quality Assurance Representative (QAR) has accepted
the contractor's final delivery for a contract, the course of
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action that is required depends upon some or all of the
criteria discussed above. Through the CAMIS II data base,
parts and contract line items can be associated with the
correct weapon system, contract type, contracting activity,
item manager and other cognizant external activities for those
parts. Because of the historical relationship between the
government and production at FMC-Naval Systems Division,
property management is very complex and requires a more
detailed system to augment MOCAS. CAMIS II has successfully
automated the cumbersome manual filing system that was first
used with MOCAS and then with CAMIS I after the conversion to
NAVPRO in 1982.
While CAMIS I was in use, the contracts division was the
sole point of data input into the system. CAMIS I was used
almost exclusively for generating external reports and was
reviewed by the division head for useful management
information. Some of the functions that could have been
possible with CAMIS I were not used because of the lack of
access to the system and the slow response time caused by the
centralized location of the computer hardware that ran CAMIS
I. Computer reports were generally produced monthly and only
one procurement clerk had on-line access.
CAMIS II has been developed by the end users and has
therefore become a dynamic and more effective operational
tool. Although CAMIS II provides all of the benefits that
were possible previously, it is accessible to the end-users
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and managers within the division for real-time use. Because
it encompasses CAMIS I (which was modeled after MOCAS) , much
of the CAMIS II information is a duplication of that which is
currently available from MOCAS. However, the accessibility
and flexibility of CAMIS II provides additional support to all
of the government activities that interact with DPRO FMC. It
therefore serves as a vital management tool for the people
administering the contracts and is not just an information
tool for top management.
A third major service that the ACO can provide to the PCO
as a result of the development of CAMIS II is the ability to
track the Contract Deliverable Requirements List (CDRL)
.
Because MOCAS subdivides a contract no lower than to contract
line items, a CDRL may appear on a MOCAS report to look the
same as one deliverable piece of hardware. In reality, the
CDRL is likely to be a myriad of paper reports or deliverable
documentation that the contractor is required to deliver to
the government. The contract line item that contains the CDRL
will appear delinquent as long as any one of the many CDRL
items is delinquent. CAMIS II gives the ACO the ability to
isolate which specific CDRL item or items are missing or
delinquent, evaluate their impact and advise the PCO, who can
then make the determination if the delinquent CDRL item is of
such material importance as to warrant remedial action. It
may be in the best interest of the government to modify the
contract by deleting that single item or to seek consideration
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from the contractor commensurate with the missing or
delinquent item. This feature of CAMIS II not only provides
a valuable service that MOCAS does not provide, but it also
potentially saves time and money for the government by
enhancing the management of those deliverables that are really
necessary, useful and timely while expediting the closing out
of contracts that are substantially but not technically
complete.
The broad goal of CAMIS II is the same as that of MOCAS.
That goal is to provide information which will lead to the
acquisition of the best product for the government at a fair
and reasonable price and meeting the terms and conditions of
the contract. Although MOCAS is the designated Management
Information System for the Defense Contract Management Command
activities, the management information provided by MOCAS does
not allow the same level of service and detail that is
currently provided through the use of CAMIS II at DPRO FMC.
The information that is adequate for management at the DCASR
level is not necessarily the best information for the DPRO
Commander to plan, organize, lead and control the resources
within the subordinate command.
If MOCAS is the only automated system used for transaction
processing and managerial decision making, the broadest
objectives of the DPRO could still be realized. However, the
quality and timeliness of responses to external ad hoc queries
would not be maintained without CAMIS II. The detailed advice
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and support provided by DPRO FMC to the PCO would also decline
without the use of CAMIS II.
42
IV. CONFIGURATION OPTIONS AND ANALYSES
A. INTRODUCTION
This research recommends the most efficient method of
collecting management information for on-site management by
DPRO Commanders. Without ignoring the importance of all
phases of a complete analysis, this thesis is limited in scope
to the evaluation of existing options which minimize the use
of DPRO resources while providing the benefits currently
available from MOCAS and CAMIS II.
The analysis of alternatives must begin with an
understanding of the requirements. An evaluation then
compares each alternative by its ability to meet the
requirements. The system that achieves those goals and is
most advantageous to the organization is therefore the
alternative most highly recommended. [Ref. 19 :p. 5-2]
Defining the requirements of a management information
system that combines decision making and transaction
processing for an organization the size of a Defense Contract
Administration Services Region (DCASR) is a formidable task.
If the goals are accurately defined for one level of
management, they must be reviewed to ensure that they meet the
needs of the other management levels. This is necessary
because of the complexity of the relationships with external
activities and internal layers of management. The level of
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management represented by the customers of the DCASR may be
satisfied with the information provided by MOCAS. However,
the requirements of the DPRO's customers are significantly
different and may require the collection of different data
elements.
The organization defining the requirements of a management
information system must view the requirements from the
perspectives of the strategic and the tactical managers.
MOCAS was retained by the Defense Logistics Agency because it
meets the strategic management information needs of the DCASR
and the activities with which it interacts and to whom it
provides support. These activities include the funding office
(i.e., Navy Regional Finance Center), the contracting office
(i.e., Naval Sea Systems Command), and the consignee (i.e.,
Naval Supply Centers) . Each DPRO merely provides data for
input into the MOCAS system and is not a customer of the DCASR
as are the interacting activities and supported activities
that define the data elements which must be collected by MOCAS
to accomplish their missions. The tactical level of
management, DPRO, had to define the requirements of its
customers (i.e., the program manager, the in-service
engineering activities, item managers, the DCASR, etc.).
These requirements were defined by the NAVPRO and were
satisfied by CAMIS II before MOCAS was available. It is
important to evaluate the requirements of each customer of the
DCASR and DPRO in an effort to assess the value of those
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requirements, but that is beyond the scope of this discussion
of optimal data gathering methods. Since there is no
indication to the contrary, an assumption is made that MOCAS
meets the management requirements of the DCASR and CAMIS II
provides the degree of support necessary for management of
DPRO FMC.
Two further assumptions must be reiterated. First,
technical feasibility of the required hardware and software
for each alternative system was not analyzed. However, the
alternatives discussed are limited to those systems which are
either in place, are combinations of existing systems, or are
minor enhancements to the existing systems, MOCAS and CAMIS
II. The implementation of each alterative can be accomplished
with negligible impact on the DPRO FMC resources or current
operations. A second assumption is that the cost difference
between the alternatives is insignificant. Most hardware and
software costs associated with both systems are now sunk
costs.
The costs of the operational phase of the life cycle
cannot be compared to the benefits unless the requirements are
explicitly defined and evaluated for each activity and each
system. The vast number of data elements and the number of
activities supported by DPRO make even a rough estimate of the
cost and benefits to the government beyond the scope of this
research. However, if individual data elements were assigned
a monetary value, it would be possible to compare the expense
45
borne by the DPRO to maintain and provide that information
against the value of the information to the customer. For
example, if DPRO FMC stopped tracking CDRLs, each activity
that depended on DPRO FMC's support would have to determine
the cost incurred by the government due to the lack of that
information. If the service provided by DPRO FMC was so
valuable that the customers could not operate without the
information, each supported activity would have to bear the
cost of developing and maintaining its own system. Future
research may assign values to each of the data elements used
by the customer commands, but this discussion assumes that all
support provided by DPRO FMC is necessary and will continue.
By realistically limiting the alternatives to those
options that do not differ in implementation cost, the best
alterative will be judged by a single criterion. The
configuration which captures all data elements needed to meet
the business objectives of the DPRO while using the fewest
DPRO resources will be the recommend alternative. The
discussion of alternatives will concentrate on the advantages
and disadvantages of maintaining and accessing management
information under each configuration.
Finally, MOCAS is a mandated system. No viable
alternative for a DPRO Commander includes the elimination of
MOCAS reporting requirements. Each alternative must therefore
include maintaining MOCAS. The research for this thesis
explored the possibility of making changes to the MOCAS system
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to include the additional tasks performed by CAMIS II.
However, discussions with the DCASR St. Louis Transition
Management Office (TMO) indicated that no changes to MOCAS
have been approved, and that there is only one minor change
request presently under review.
Three alternatives meet the criteria of maintaining MOCAS
and still providing the level of support that is currently
available through the use of CAMIS II.
• Use MOCAS as the only automated system (with manual
systems used to accomplish the information processing
tasks of CAMIS II)
• Maintain the status quo
• Use MOCAS and enhance CAMIS II with a local area network
B. ALTERNATIVE ONE — USE MOCAS EXCLUSIVELY
A realistic alternative is to maintain MOCAS as required
and eliminate the use of any other automated system at the
DPRO. If the current process of contract data entry
continues, MOCAS will be the only automated system that
contains a complete data base on each contract. Currently,
new contracts are entered into the MOCAS system, but not into
CAMIS II, as they are awarded. When the contract closeout
procedure is complete for currently active contracts (which
are only maintained at the DPRO in the CAMIS II system) , they
are deleted from the CAMIS II data base. Natural attrition
will eventually make CAMIS II obsolete unless a decision is
made to continue entering new contracts into CAMIS II (in
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addition to MOCAS) . If no such decision is made, within
several months MOCAS will be the only system available to the
DPRO.
This alternative must also be considered because it is
used in many contract administration offices with apparent
success. Prior to its conversion to a Navy activity, DPRO FMC
relied solely on MOCAS as its automated information system.
All Defense Logistic Agency Contract Administration Service
offices have continuously used MOCAS to successfully manage
contracts assigned to their commands. Prior to the DMR
initiatives, three Army Plant Representative Offices had
already adopted MOCAS as their automated information system.
This would imply that some Plant Representative Offices can
successfully fulfill their mission through the use of MOCAS
alone.
1. Advantages
The entry of data into MOCAS for most contractual
actions is done centrally by the DCASR. Few changes to the
data base are allowed to be entered by , e field activities.
Only administrative data such as codes designating responsible
personnel at the DPRO and the date and number of DD Form 250 's
that are signed by the Quality Assurance Representative (QAR)
can be entered into MOCAS by DPRO personnel. With MOCAS as
the only data base, the need for data entry personnel at DPRO
FMC would be greatly reduced.
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Information could be tightly controlled by
centralizing the flow of input and output. One benefit of
controlling the information would be realized through the
contractor claims process. Monetary settlements are sometimes
awarded to the contractor by the government because
conflicting information is provided to the contractor by
different activities within the government. If all activities
within the government could speak with one voice (because the
information came from a central source) , many contractor
claims against the government could be avoided. It would also
provide a buffer between DPRO employees and influences from
outside the normal chain of command such as civilian companies
contracted by the government to assist in the management of
specific contracts. In such cases, if MOCAS was the only
repository of management information, less time would be spent
by DPRO employees interacting with other commands who had
access to MOCAS.
Any future move toward integration of automated
acquisition systems is predicated upon the establishment of
some standard system which must be implemented by each
participant in the acquisition process. A major goal in
standardization is realized by the acceptance of MOCAS for use
by all contract administration offices within the Defense
Logistics Agency. With a standard in place, integration is
easier to achieve between MOCAS and the various mechanized
systems of other government agencies and the private sector
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(such as Ships Parts Control Center's automated tracking
system for government parts being repaired under contracts
with civilian contractors). [Ref. 15:p. 3-4]
All efforts to establish the interface between MOCAS
and DPRO FMC have been completed. Therefore, the amount of
resources and personnel that are devoted to CAMIS II
maintenance and training will no longer be required.
All of the advantages that would be realized by using
MOCAS exclusively relate to the efficient use of resources by
the DPRO Commander. Using MOCAS as the only automated
management information system would not improve the method of
collecting the data elements which are necessary for the
management information needed at the DPRO.
2. Disadvantages
While MOCAS accomplishes the reporting of contract
status at each field activity, it does not have the
flexibility to respond to ad hoc queries from internal or
external sources. Responses to ad hoc queries are requested
from DPRO FMC by many sources. For example, ad hoc queries
could be received from a deployed ship calling for the current
status of a repair part or from a DPRO manager requesting the
number of Material Review Boards conducted during a given
period. Assuming that all of the ad hoc queries satisfy
legitimate requirements, some method of maintaining that data
is required. If MOCAS contained the data needed to respond to
ad hoc queries and could provide these responses in a timely
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manner, it would presently be used as the system of choice by
the activities initiating the queries. Further, the workload
of DPRO FMC would be diminished if answers to such queries
were available in MOCAS. Unfortunately, even those data
elements which are available in MOCAS are not always easily
accessible because of the urgency of the requests and the
delay in response from MOCAS.
Data entry is accomplished primarily by the DCASR.
The DPRO managers do not have a means to control the
timeliness and accuracy of the data used for routine decision
making at the DPRO. Thus, the DPRO Commander takes action on
information that appears to be current in MOCAS.
Unfortunately, there is no mechanism to report the delay in
entering the data after an event has occurred. Therefore, the
DPRO Commander has no control over the timeliness of the
information in MOCAS which is used for managing the DPRO.
Three significant tasks are currently required for
managing contracts at DPRO FMC but are not supported by MOCAS.
These tasks are:
• The sub-dividing of Contract Line Item Numbers to enable
the monitoring of individual parts.
• The identification of contract deliverables by the weapon
system to which they pertain.
• The ability to monitor Contract Deliverable Requirements
Lists as individual deliverables.
These three tasks are required to support the DPRO mission and
must be accomplished by some manual information system if
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MOCAS is the only automated information system available to
the DPRO.
MOCAS does not provide timely information for the
management of resources at the DPRO. Summarized reports can
be requested but are not delivered on a real-time basis.
Requests for summarized reports are typically filled by the
following work day, but the length of the delay depends upon
the DCASR staff workload. Trend analysis in specific areas
and relationships between various factors are not accomplished
because of the delay in response time and the lack of
sufficient detail in the MOCAS reports themselves.
C. ALTERNATIVE TWO — MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO
Both automated systems (MOCAS and CAMIS II) can continue
to be fully maintained. This configuration depicts the status
quo.
1. Advantages
MOCAS contains all of the information needed to meet
the requirements of the managers at the regional level. CAMIS
successfully meets the requirements of the on-site managers
and operational employees. Maintaining both MOCAS and CAMIS
ensures that all requirements would be satisfied and maximum
flexibility would remain to enhance CAMIS II for future
requirements
.
Maintaining and updating MOCAS is less labor intensive
when the data is duplicated in CAMIS II. For example, when
MOCAS prints the Production Administration Delinquency Report
52
(PADR) for DPRO FMC, it is given to an Industrial Specialist
who reviews the details of the delinquent contract line item.
The Industrial Specialist will immediately query CAMIS II to
review the facts pertaining to this delinquency. The
divisional manager can query CAMIS II to look for trends of
delinquency within that contract, the specific weapon system,
the business unit of the contractor's plant, or even the
performance of the Industrial Specialist responsible for
tracking the delinquent line item.
The dual systems serve as complements to each other
when used in this manner. CAMIS II can be used to update
MOCAS while MOCAS is used by the Industrial Specialist to
verify information and assure the accurate documentation of
each transaction. To illustrate this point, consider the
following specific transaction. The PADR from MOCAS of 6
September, 1990 showed that a Blast Shield ordered by contract
N00104-88-G0162 Line Item 0001 AA was delinquent. However,
CAMIS II did not show this delivery as being delinquent. Upon
closer examination, it was found that the contract had been
modified during the previous month and that the line item had
been canceled at no cost to the government. CAMIS II provided
this real-time information which helped monitor the input of
changes into MOCAS. The information flow and data entry to
MOCAS lagged to such a degree that the PADR was not accurate
in this case.
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If the end user of an automated system is evaluated by
criteria which are within his or her control, then he or she
has a personal stake in the accuracy and maintenance of the
data. In the preceding example, the Industrial Specialist
used CAMIS II as a tool to prevent delinquent deliveries.
Reports from MOCAS are used to evaluate the performance of an
individual employee because the MOCAS
.
data base is the
responsibility of several employees and commands. The dual
system alternative places the responsibility for accuracy of
the data base with the people who most affect the data and
therefore contribute to meeting the objectives of the command.
Although CAMIS II and MOCAS are technically reliable
systems, Alternative Two includes CAMIS II which, as a subset
of MOCAS, offers additional reliability and accessibility. If
the MOCAS system is unavailable because of hardware or
communication problems, data can still be manipulated to
satisfy the need of the customers. This alternative meets
every requirement for effectively managing the field activity.
2. Disadvantages
,
Without completing a comprehensive cost analysis, it
is impossible to assign a cost associated with maintaining
dual systems. However, it is intuitively certain that
entering data repetitively is less productive than entering it
once. The effort to maintain CAMIS II is intensive at the
DPRO level. Most of the data elements that comprise MOCAS are
entered at the regional level or at other commands, so if
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CAMIS II did not exist, there would be minimal data entry done
by DPRO FMC personnel.
Whenever data fields are duplicated between systems or
within a single system, there is a high risk that some data
will be inconsistent [Ref. 16:p. 202], If there exist
inconsistencies between CAMIS and MOCAS, they are resolved by
reviewing periodic reports. However, each division of the
DPRO maintains an autonomous part of the CAMIS data base.
Many of the data fields are duplicated by each divisional data
base and this redundancy increases the chance of erroneous
input or the simultaneous representation of the same event at
different periods of time. For instance, when delivery is
accepted by the Quality Assurance Representative (QAR) , it is
immediately entered into the QA data base for CAMIS II. An ad
hoc query by any other division would not indicate that the
item was delivered until the DD Form 250 had passed to each
division for entry into that division's data base. Therefore,
the primary disadvantage of Alternative Two is the inherent
loss of efficiency caused by multiple entries of identical
data.
D. ALTERATIVE THREE — ENHANCE CAMIS WITH A LOCAL AREA
NETWORK
All of the functional divisions of DPRO FMC maintain
sections of CAMIS II. All divisions are currently connected
via a local area network (LAN) , with the exception of the
Quality Assurance Division which is scheduled to be connected
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presently. It is now feasible to turn CAMIS II into an
integrated, distributed data base.
1 . Advantages
All of the advantages of Alternative Two can be
realized by the configuration described as Alternative Three.
In addition, every user will have access to real-time data
between divisions as well as within the division. The flow of
hard copy documents (i.e., DD Form 250' s, Property Clearance
Reports, etc.) can be minimized by assigning responsibility
for the entry of critical information to one division and then
allowing the system to update all related files that are
affected by the entry of that data.
Data that is currently entered multiple times can be
entered once. For example, when a new contract is awarded,
basic information would be entered concurrent with the
distribution of the hard copy of the contract by the Contracts
Division procurement clerk. The contract number, contract
type, applicable weapon system, line item numbers and delivery
dates would already be available when the contract is reviewed
by each functional division. As data is entered by the
responsible personnel, the information would be available
immediately for anyone authorized to view it. As the QAR
documents the delivery of line items by entering the DD Form
250 date and number, the schedule used by the Industrial
Specialist to track delinquent contract line items would
immediately be updated. The ACO would see that the item was
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accepted by the QAR before the hard copy was routed to the
contract file where it must be filed and retained as the
legally binding documentation. When final deliveries are
documented, the Property Administrator would be notified of
the physical completion and start the actions necessary to
close out the contract. The Contracts Division monitors
closeout procedures and all supporting actions could
automatically update the closeout data base. Accurate and
real-time status of all closeouts would be available for
management review.
The level of detail that is currently maintained to
meet customer requirements would be available with this
configuration. All benefits realized from the CAMIS II data
base would continue to be of service. However, timeliness and
accessibility would be increased with this option while the
manpower required for data entry would decrease.
2. Disadvantages
Increased management oversight is required for the
implementation of a successful distributed system. While the
strength of CAMIS II lies in innovative development by the end
users, tighter control must be exercised for a distributed
system. The implementation and operation of a distributed
data base requires knowledgeable leadership to control access
and integration, to manage resources and to ensure efficiency
of operation [Ref. 16:p. 197 - 209]. However, the current
computer support staff has successfully accomplished these
57
tasks before. The current operation of the LAN shows that
they have the requisite knowledge and training to provide the
necessary coordination to effectively administer the
configuration described as Alternative Three.
E. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES
Three alternative configurations can meet the needs of the
DPRO management by using existing systems and resources alone
or in combination. Each option must include the mandated
system of MOCAS.
Alternative One evaluates the use of MOCAS alone. This
option reduces the DPRO resources necessary to maintain an
automated system but does not provide additional automated
tools to assist the DPRO Commander in meeting the goals of the
command. Some services that are currently provided to
customers would no longer be offered by an automated system,
so this alternative does not fully meet the requirements of
the command.
Alternative Two combines the use of MOCAS and CAMIS II as
it is presently maintained. While retaining the advantages of
standardization discussed for Alternative One, this option
meets all of the requirements for the command to support its
customers. It serves the operational level employee who
controls the data for transaction processing, and the same raw
data is processed to provide information for the tactical and
strategic levels of management within the command. However,
the current system is inefficient and introduces the
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unnecessary risk of providing inaccurate information for the
DPRO management by duplicating the entry of data within each
division.
Alternative Three is the status quo with improvements
provided by use of the existing LAN. All of the benefits from
Alternatives One and Two would be realized but the
disadvantages associated with duplicate entry would be
eliminated. Increased management would be required, but this
could be accomplished by redirecting available resources
rather than creating additional workload.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this research was to find the most
efficient method of collecting information for the management
of a Naval Plant Representative Office (NAVPRO) after
conversion to a Defense Plant Representative Office (DPRO)
.
An efficient method is defined as the means of achieving
stated criteria using the least amount of resources.
Efficiency, as opposed to the effectiveness of a system, is
not judged by the determination of which data elements should
be collected but by the way in which the predefined data are
gathered and maintained. [Ref. 17 :p. 213]
The research conducted in support of the following
recommendations was limited to the most productive (efficient)
way of collecting management information using existing
resources. As stated in Chapter One, it is assumed that all
data elements are necessary (effective' ; n accomplishing the
mission of the command. To gather the current data elements
in the most efficient manner, it is recommended that
Alternative Three, maintaining MOCAS with an enhancement of
CAMIS, be pursued. MOCAS provides necessary functions at the
regional level and CAMIS contributes the services required by
the customer of DPRO FMC.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of the secondary research questions support
the conclusion that management information is most efficiently
collected by a dual system of MOCAS and a modified CAMIS. The
following discussion answers the three secondary research
questions.
1. Finding One
What items of information were collected under the
NAVPRO Contract Administration Management Information System
(CAMIS) model that are not required for MOCAS?
• MOCAS is not designed to differentiate contract
deliverables by weapon system. The MOCAS automated
system cannot effectively be used by an organization
which is intrinsically structured in a manner similar to
the matrix organizational plan. Although functional
divisions of DPRO FMC are permanently established,
members of each division are assigned to specific project
teams. This is the same as the organizational structure
of the contractor and several of the government
activities to whom DPRO FMC routinely provides support.
In the absence of CAMIS, some type of a data base that
associates a contract number to a specific program would
still be necessary to meet customer needs. An auxiliary
system could be implemented to support the ACO with very
little effect on the productivity of the DPRO employees.
However, to provide the current level of support to the
Program Managers, in-service engineering activities, item
managers, etc., a significant amount of effort would be
required to maintain an auxiliary system. All
deliverables, dollar values, government owned property
and line items would need segregating by weapon system to
respond to most ad hoc queries.
• MOCAS is deficient in its ability to track Contract Line
Item Numbers (CLINs) . Contracts are sub-divided into
categories delineated by numeric CLINs and sub-line items
designated by alpha characters. This is only adequate
for the tracking of single deliveries which correlate to
single sub-line items. For example, a CLIN could be for
a single, major acquisition such as the delivery of one
completed weapon system. In this case, the CLIN is
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readily identified as corresponding to a system that may
even be designated by a unique serial number. However,
a CLIN could also be for several small repair parts and
even the sub-line item could be a grouping of several
items that are defined only by the manufacturer's part
numbers. If any individual part requires attention,
MOCAS does not adequately differentiate one part from
another at an acceptable level of detail. If MOCAS
generates a report requiring action on a specific CLIN
and sub-line item of a certain contract, there may be no
way of responding without a detailed data base that
tracks and assigns part numbers to CLINs and sub-line
items. The contract file contains a reference to each
item but the volume of parts requiring action warrants an
automated data base to administer the contract
efficiently. CAMIS tracks the progress of each
manufacturer's part number as it is listed in the
contract. Without a detailed data base like CAMIS, it
would be an extremely labor intensive task to update the
MOCAS data base in response to DCASR queries that don't
identify the sub-line items by individual part numbers.
MOCAS does not record and track Contract Deliverable
Requirements Lists (CDRLs) individually. There is a
definite value to the government if CDRLs are pro-
actively managed by the ACO. CDRLs cannot be pro-
actively managed unless they are identified and tracked
individually. Frequently, individual items become
obsolete if not delivered on scheduled. The contractual
delivery dates are often complex and are based upon the
delivery of a prior line item. Basically, no management
of CDRLs is possible unless each deliverable item is
monitored individually. As an example, the documentation
for a piece of hardware may be listed as a CDRL
deliverable. Its delivery date could be dependent upon
the delivery of the hardware. The government is allowed
a fixed number of days to review the documentation before
it is returned to the contractor for incorporation of the
changes directed by the government agency. The date of
return to the contractor is the basis for another
milestone specified by the CDRL. If the next deliverable
was the completed documentation with the changes
incorporated, the delivery date would be a fixed number
of days after its return from the government review. A
schedule for a complete training plan and several follow-
on items could be dependent upon that delivery. However,
if a government representative returned the document to
the contractor and failed to record the action with the
contract administrator, the entire CDRL would continue to
be reported as undelivered. Even after all hardware was
delivered to the government and put into operation, it
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would still be recorded as physically incomplete due to
the lack of documentation for that one item within the
CDRL. The total CDRL would appear delinquent on MOCAS
with no means of tracking which individual deliverable
caused the delinquency or which activity was responsible
for that item.
2 . Finding Two
What is the most effective and efficient method of
collecting management information for DPRO FMC, given that the
reporting requirements of MOCAS have been imposed upon all
Plant Representative Offices?
The government-wide advantages of conversion to the
MOCAS system cannot be understated. However, the greatest
benefits of the MOCAS system are realized at the levels of
management above the DPRO Commanders. CAMIS or some form of
an auxiliary data base must be maintained by the DPROs to cope
with the deficiencies described in the previous section. When
the benefits of MOCAS and CAMIS are both realized, the
automated systems are operating effectively. There will be
duplication of effort for data entry when identical data
elements are input at the regional level and again at the
field activity. However, this can be minimized to promote
efficiency by developing CAMIS into an integrated system
connected via the current LAN, so the data elements input into
CAMIS will only be entered once at the DPRO level.
3. Finding Three
What modifications would be required to MOCAS if it
was to service as the sole management information system of
on-site managers of DPROS?
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Major modifications to MOCAS could provide the
information required by on-site managers at all field
activities. However, to meet the diverse need of each
activity within the newly formed Defense Contract Management
Command by modifying MOCAS is not a realistic solution based
on the limited number of changes that are being considered for
approval by the DCASR.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Recommendation One
DPRO FMC should redirect the necessary resources to
ensure that CAMIS is maintained. The CAMIS system will be
used for the next several years if only to administer the
currently active contracts which were not entered into the
MOCAS system. However, some local method of augmenting MOCAS
will always be necessary and CAMIS presently does this task
effectively.
All contracts assigned to DPRO FMC as the contract
administration office since the conversion to the MOCAS system
should be entered into CAMIS. Management information is more
efficiently gathered from CAMIS than from MOCAS because it is
more timely, provides faster response time, it is more
flexible and, most importantly, is controlled by the end
users. The level of support that is currently provided to
customer commands will either be unavailable or require
establishment of additional independent data bases within the




CAMIS should be enhanced by integrating the data base
between all functional divisions. By exploiting the value of
the existing LAN, a logically distributed data base could be
instituted to minimize the effort expended on raw data entry.
This would also maximize the use of transactional data as
management information by providing all managers with current
and consistent output from all the DPRO's divisions.
3. Recommendations Three
Although changes to MOCAS were not recommended as a
solution to the immediate problems facing Plant Representative
Offices, a long range plan warrants consideration by DPRO
Commanders. The adoption of MOCAS for all contract
administration functions has attained the goal of creating a
standard system among related offices within the acquisition
process. Increased emphasis can now be placed on system
integration between these offices. [Ref. 15: p. 3-4]
Currently, each DCASR processes information which is
provided from various sources. Some of the sources are on-
line and others rely on the transmission of data via hard
copy. If information was processed at the input location and
at the time that the raw data was entered and then transmitted
to the DCASR, the business objectives of all levels of the
organization could be accomplished in a more efficient manner.
As computing power becomes more accessible and decreases in
cost, communication costs gain relative importance in the
65
evaluation of automation strategies. Resources which are
located where they are most frequently used and where the data
is processed will minimize communication requirements while
maximizing the use of available processing power. [Ref . 16:p.
233 - 238] This efficiency can be realized by the
distribution or placement of data processing functions at the
local command and defining an interchangeable format to
transfer the information between commands. As one future
option, the information collected at the operational level of
the administration activity could be summarized and uploaded
to the DCASR each night. Real time information at the payment
office (which is necessary for routine operation at the
office) could be summarized in a daily data transfer to meet
the requirements of most commands. This configuration would
keep relevant information active and current at the level
where it is used operationally while providing appropriate
periodic summaries to other levels of management. Managers
would still have access to all data by query, but the bulk of
the data passed to them would be in ,ie form of reports
formatted in the most useful style for that manager (i.e.,
summarized transactions, exception reports, graphical
displays, etc.). While this appears to limit the control
exercised by a central office such as the DCASR, it would
still provide all of the information currently used by the
DCASR but would filter out the data irrelevant to management
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at that level. By transferring only the information actually
used by the DCASR, efficiency would be increased.
This configuration would give total autonomy to the
field offices in the initiation of their automated systems to
fulfill each command's individual needs. If all data was of
the type and in the format required by the DCASR system,
requested data could be up-loaded periodically and thereby
accomplish the goals of all levels of management with one
automated system. Although the description of this
configuration does not provide a solution to the current
research question, it may be a feasible alternative in the
future. In May of 1988, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
directed the use of American Nation Standards Institute (ANSI)
X.12 Electronic Data Interchange as the standard for all
business related exchanges of data between DoD and
contractors. This contributes to the possibility of one day
implementing a system that is an integral part of all
participants in the defense acquisition process. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) is
charged with oversight of several committees to coordinate and
attain such a goal. [Ref. 15:p. 2-7 - 2-11]
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